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Two processes

  • 1 two processes are not analogous with each other

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > two processes are not analogous with each other

  • 2 two-photon processes

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > two-photon processes

  • 3 intermolecular two-state excited-state processes

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > intermolecular two-state excited-state processes

  • 4 analogous

    [ë'nælëgës] adj. i ngjashëm, analog; the two processes are analogous të dy proceset janë të ngjashme
    * * *
    analog

    English-Albanian dictionary > analogous

  • 5 Bessemer, Sir Henry

    SUBJECT AREA: Metallurgy
    [br]
    b. 19 January 1813 Charlton (near Hitchin), Hertfordshire, England
    d. 15 January 1898 Denmark Hill, London, England
    [br]
    English inventor of the Bessemer steelmaking process.
    [br]
    The most valuable part of Bessemer's education took place in the workshop of his inventor father. At the age of only 17 he went to London to seek his fortune and set himself up in the trade of casting art works in white metal. He went on to the embossing of metals and other materials and this led to his first major invention, whereby a date was incorporated in the die for embossing seals, thus preventing the wholesale forgeries that had previously been committed. For this, a grateful Government promised Bessemer a paid position, a promise that was never kept; recognition came only in 1879 with a belated knighthood. Bessemer turned to other inventions, mainly in metalworking, including a process for making bronze powder and gold paint. After he had overcome technical problems, the process became highly profitable, earning him a considerable income during the forty years it was in use.
    The Crimean War presented inventors such as Bessemer with a challenge when weaknesses in the iron used to make the cannon became apparent. In 1856, at his Baxter House premises in St Paneras, London, he tried fusing cast iron with steel. Noticing the effect of an air current on the molten mixture, he constructed a reaction vessel or converter in which air was blown through molten cast iron. There was a vigorous reaction which nearly burned the house down, and Bessemer found the iron to be almost completely decarburized, without the slag threads always present in wrought iron. Bessemer had in fact invented not only a new process but a new material, mild steel. His paper "On the manufacture of malleable iron and steel without fuel" at the British Association meeting in Cheltenham later that year created a stir. Bessemer was courted by ironmasters to license the process. However, success was short-lived, for they found that phosphorus in the original iron ore passed into the metal and rendered it useless. By chance, Bessemer had used in his trials pig-iron, derived from haematite, a phosphorus-free ore. Bessemer tried hard to overcome the problem, but lacking chemical knowledge he resigned himself to limiting his process to this kind of pig-iron. This limitation was removed in 1879 by Sidney Gilchrist Thomas, who substituted a chemically basic lining in the converter in place of the acid lining used by Bessemer. This reacted with the phosphorus to form a substance that could be tapped off with the slag, leaving the steel free from this harmful element. Even so, the new material had begun to be applied in engineering, especially for railways. The open-hearth process developed by Siemens and the Martin brothers complemented rather than competed with Bessemer steel. The widespread use of the two processes had a revolutionary effect on mechanical and structural engineering and earned Bessemer around £1 million in royalties before the patents expired.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Knighted 1879. FRS 1879. Royal Society of Arts Albert Gold Medal 1872.
    Bibliography
    1905, Sir Henry Bessemer FRS: An Autobiography, London.
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Bessemer, Sir Henry

  • 6 lock

    Ensure that two processes do not affect the same file or project in a database at the same time.

    English-Arabic terms dictionary > lock

  • 7 Cognitive Psychology

       The basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the reason for studying anything else: because they are there. Our knowledge of the world must be somehow developed from stimulus input.... Cognitive processes surely exist, so it can hardly be unscientific to study them. (Neisser, 1967, p. 5).
       The task of the cognitive psychologist is a highly inferential one. The cognitive psychologist must proceed from observations of the behavior of humans performing intellectual tasks to conclusions about the abstract mechanisms underlying the behavior. Developing a theory in cognitive psychology is much like developing a model for the working of the engine of a strange new vehicle by driving the vehicle, being unable to open it up to inspect the engine itself....
       It is well understood from the automata theory... that many different mechanisms can generate the same external behavior. (Anderson, 1980, pp. 12, 17)
       [Cognitive psychology does not] deal with whole people but with a very special and bizarre-almost Frankensteinian-preparation, which consists of a brain attached to two eyes, two ears, and two index fingers. This preparation is only to be found inside small, gloomy cubicles, outside which red lights burn to warn ordinary people away.... It does not feel hungry or tired or inquisitive; it does not think extraneous thoughts or try to understand what is going on. It is, in short, a computer, made in the image of the larger electronic organism that sends it stimuli and records its responses. (Claxton, 1980, p. 13)
       4) Cognitive Psychology Has Not Succeeded in Making a Significant Contribution to the Understanding of the Human Mind
       Cognitive psychology is not getting anywhere; that in spite of our sophisticated methodology, we have not succeeded in making a substantial contribution toward the understanding of the human mind.... A short time ago, the information processing approach to cognition was just beginning. Hopes were high that the analysis of information processing into a series of discrete stages would offer profound insights into human cognition. But in only a few short years the vigor of this approach was spent. It was only natural that hopes that had been so high should sink low. (Glass, Holyoak & Santa, 1979, p. ix)
       Cognitive psychology attempts to understand the nature of human intelligence and how people think. (Anderson, 1980, p. 3)
       The past few years have witnessed a noticeable increase in interest in an investigation of the cognitive processes.... It has resulted from a recognition of the complex processes that mediate between the classical "stimuli" and "responses" out of which stimulus-response learning theories hoped to fashion a psychology that would by-pass anything smacking of the "mental." The impeccable peripheralism of such theories could not last. One might do well to have a closer look at these intervening "cognitive maps." (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956, p. vii)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Psychology

  • 8 Intelligence

       There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)
       It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)
       ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)
       Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)
       Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.
       1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.
       2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.
       3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.
       4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)
       High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)
       There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)
       Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence

  • 9 Introspection

       1) Experimental Introspection Is the One Reliable Method of Knowing Ourselves
       When we are trying to understand the mental processes of a child or a dog or an insect as shown by conduct and action, the outward signs of mental processes,... we must always fall back upon experimental introspection... [;] we cannot imagine processes in another mind that we do not find in our own. Experimental introspection is thus our one reliable method of knowing ourselves; it is the sole gateway to psychology. (Titchener, 1914, p. 32)
       There is a somewhat misleading point of view that one's own experience provides a sufficient understanding of mental life for scientific purposes. Indeed, early in the history of experimental psychology, the main method for studying cognition was introspection. By observing one's own mind, the argument went, one could say how one carried out cognitive activities....
       Yet introspection failed to be a good technique for the elucidation of mental processes in general. There are two simple reasons for this. First, so many things which we can do seem to be quite unrelated to conscious experience. Someone asks you your name. You do not know how you retrieve it, yet obviously there is some process by which the retrieval occurs. In the same way, when someone speaks to you, you understand what they say, but you do not know how you came to understand. Yet somehow processes take place in which words are picked out from the jumble of sound waves which reach your ears, in-built knowledge of syntax and semantics gives it meaning, and the significance of the message comes to be appreciated. Clearly, introspection is not of much use here, but it is undeniable that understanding language is as much a part of mental life as is thinking.
       As if these arguments were not enough, it is also the case that introspective data are notoriously difficult to evaluate. Because it is private to the experiencer, and experience may be difficult to convey in words to somebody else. Many early introspective protocols were very confusing to read and, even worse, the kinds of introspection reported tended to conform to the theoretical categories used in different laboratories. Clearly, what was needed was both a change in experimental method and a different (non-subjective) theoretical framework to describe mental life. (Sanford, 1987, pp. 2-3)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Introspection

  • 10 Processing Systems

       Determining the Hierarchical Position of a Processing System Involved in a Performance Task
       The position of any processing system within the hierarchy is determined by two major criteria: (1) the generality-specificity of the processing system and (2) the degree of automaticity of the processing system. Relatively general and non-automatic processes appear towards the top of the hierarchy, and specific, automatic processes occur at the bottom. As a rule of thumb, the location in the hierarchy of the processes involved in the performance of a task can be assessed by a series of experiments in which the task is paired with several others: higher-level processes will more consistently produce interference than will low-level processes. (Eysenck, 1982, p. 45)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Processing Systems

  • 11 process

    1) процесс; операция; обработка || обрабатывать
    2) способ; метод; приём, технологический приём
    •
    - adiabatic process
    - AMT-supported manufacturing process
    - atmospheric heat treatment process
    - automated learning process
    - back-to-back processes
    - batch process
    - batch-flow process
    - brand new process
    - break-in process
    - centrifuging process
    - chipless process
    - CNC process
    - CO2 process
    - command production process
    - communication process
    - computational process
    - concurrent processes
    - conduction laser welding process
    - constant-pressure process
    - continuous process
    - controlled process
    - conversion process
    - coordinate production process
    - creep feed process
    - Delphi process
    - design/drafting/manufacturing process
    - diazo process
    - die-casting process
    - discrete deterministic multistage decision process
    - discrete stochastic multistage decision process
    - D-process
    - EDM process
    - electroarc process
    - execute production process
    - feature process
    - first process
    - Floturn process
    - generic process
    - hazardous process
    - heuristic thought process
    - high-energy welding process
    - hot-dip process
    - hot-dipping process
    - image-matching process
    - in-line process
    - intralevel communication process
    - IPG process
    - isothermal process
    - isothermic process
    - isovolumic process
    - job-shop process
    - kitting process
    - laser automated process
    - laser process
    - low energy-density fusion welding process
    - low-productive process
    - manufacturing process
    - master control process
    - metal deformation process
    - metal-removal process
    - monobath process
    - multiple-cutter process
    - multistage decision process
    - near-net-shape process
    - neural-network process
    - nonmachining process
    - off-line process
    - one-axis process
    - oscillating process
    - out-of-control process
    - part process
    - pick-and-place process
    - pilot production process
    - plant process
    - plasma-beam process
    - point-of-use manufacturing process
    - polygraphic processes
    - post-grinding process
    - primary process
    - principal process
    - production process
    - quasi-independent processes
    - random process
    - renewal process
    - robot-controlled process
    - sampling process
    - secondary process
    - self-controlling process
    - sensor-driver process
    - servo process
    - single-cutter process
    - smoothing process
    - standard manufacturing process
    - stop-start process
    - supervise production process
    - system process
    - totally integrated process
    - transfer process
    - trial-and-error process
    - two-bath process
    - under control process
    - walk-through process
    - wear process

    English-Russian dictionary of mechanical engineering and automation > process

  • 12 Creativity

       Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)
       Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)
       There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)
       he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)
       he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)
       From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)
       Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)
       The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)
       In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)
       he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)
        11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder
       Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)
       New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)
       [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....
       Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)
       A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....
       Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity

  • 13 Bibliography

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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 14 the ...

    ((with comparative adjective or adverb) used to show the connection or relationship between two actions, states, processes etc: The harder you work, the more you earn.) jo... jo; jo... desto
    * * *
    ((with comparative adjective or adverb) used to show the connection or relationship between two actions, states, processes etc: The harder you work, the more you earn.) jo... jo; jo... desto

    English-Danish dictionary > the ...

  • 15 Ives, Frederic Eugene

    [br]
    b. 17 February 1856 Litchfield, Connecticut, USA
    d. 27 May 1937 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
    [br]
    American printer who pioneered the development of photomechanical and colour photographic processes.
    [br]
    Ives trained as a printer in Ithaca, New York, and became official photographer at Cornell University at the age of 18. His research into photomechanical processes led in 1886 to methods of making halftone reproduction of photographs using crossline screens. In 1881 he was the first to make a three-colour print from relief halftone blocks. He made significant contributions to the early development of colour photography, and from 1888 he published and marketed a number of systems for the production of additive colour photographs. He designed a beam-splitting camera in which a single lens exposed three negatives through red, green and blue filters. Black and white transparencies from these negatives were viewed in a device fitted with internal reflectors and filters, which combined the three colour separations into one full-colour image. This device was marketed in 1895 under the name Kromskop; sets of Kromograms were available commercially, and special cameras, or adaptors for conventional cameras, were available for photographers who wished to take their own colour pictures. A Lantern Kromskop was available for the projection of Kromskop pictures. Ives's system enjoyed a few years of commercial success before simpler methods of making colour photographs rendered it obsolete. Ives continued research into colour photography; his later achievements included the design, in 1915, of the Hicro process, in which a simple camera produced sets of separation negatives that could be printed as dyed transparencies in complementary colours and assembled in register on paper to produce colour prints. Later, in 1932, he introduced Polychrome, a simpler, two-colour process in which a bipack of two thin negative plates or films could be exposed in conventional cameras. Ives's interest extended into other fields, notably stereoscopy. He developed a successful parallax stereogram process in 1903, in which a three-dimensional image could be seen directly, without the use of viewing devices. In his lifetime he received many honours, and was a recipient of the Royal Photographic Society's Progress Medal in 1903 for his work in colour photography.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    B.Coe, 1978, Colour Photography: The First Hundred Years, London J.S.Friedman, 1944, History of Colour Photography, Boston. G.Koshofer, 1981, Farbfotografie, Vol. I, Munich.
    BC

    Biographical history of technology > Ives, Frederic Eugene

  • 16 Pattinson, Hugh Lee

    SUBJECT AREA: Metallurgy
    [br]
    b. 25 December 1796 Alston, Cumberland, England
    d. 11 November 1858 Scot's House, Gateshead, England
    [br]
    English inventor of a silver-extraction process.
    [br]
    Born into a Quaker family, he was educated at private schools; his studies included electricity and chemistry, with a bias towards metallurgy. Around 1821 Pattinson became Clerk and Assistant to Anthony Clapham, a soap-boiler of Newcastle upon Tyne. In 1825 he secured appointment as Assay Master to the lords of the manor of Alston. There he was able to pursue the subject of special interest to him, and in January 1829 he devised a method of separating silver from lead ore; however, he was prevented from developing it because of a lack of funds.
    Two years later he was appointed Manager of Wentworth Beaumont's lead-works. There he was able to continue his researches, which culminated in the patent of 1833 enshrining the invention by which he is best known: a new process for extracting silver from lead by skimming crystals of pure lead with a perforated ladle from the surface of the molten silver-bearing lead, contained in a succession of cast-iron pots. The molten metal was stirred as it cooled until one pot provided a metal containing 300 oz. of silver to the ton (8,370 g to the tonne). Until that time, it was unprofitable to extract silver from lead ores containing less than 8 oz. per ton (223 g per tonne), but the Pattinson process reduced that to 2–3 oz. (56–84 g per tonne), and it therefore won wide acceptance. Pattinson resigned his post and went into partnership to establish a chemical works near Gateshead. He was able to devise two further processes of importance, one an improved method of obtaining white lead and the other a new process for manufacturing magnesia alba, or basic carbonate of magnesium. Both processes were patented in 1841.
    Pattinson retired in 1858 and devoted himself to the study of astronomy, aided by a 7½ in. (19 cm) equatorial telescope that he had erected at his home at Scot's House.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Vice-President, British Association Chemical Section 1838. Fellow of the Geological Society, Royal Astronomical Society and Royal Society 1852.
    Bibliography
    Pattinson wrote eight scientific papers, mainly on mining, listed in Royal Society Catalogue of Scientific Papers, most of which appeared in the Philosophical
    Magazine.
    Further Reading
    J.Percy, Metallurgy (volume on lead): 121–44 (fully describes Pattinson's desilvering process).
    Lonsdale, 1873, Worthies of Cumberland, pp. 273–320 (contains details of his life). T.K.Derry and T.I.Williams, 1960, A Short History ofTechnology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Pattinson, Hugh Lee

  • 17 Mind-body Problem

       From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)
        still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)
       here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)
       With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)
       [The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)
       The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)
       We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)
       Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem

  • 18 IMCC

    1. интеллектуальный центр управления электродвигателями

     

    интеллектуальный центр управления электродвигателями
    -
    [Интент]

    Параллельные тексты EN-RU

    iMCC ( Intelligent Motor Control Center) control switchboards are low voltage switchboards dedicated to energy distribution, as well as control and protection of motors. They are used in continuous and semi-continuous processes, in which it is necessary to group the motor starters together in one place for operational and maintenance reasons.

         Integration of motor starters in iMCC switchboards
    iMCC control switchboards make the work of operation and maintenance teams easier by improving the availability of the process, via:
    • Control of motor starters using wire-to-wire cabling or via remote I/O located as close as possible to the starters and connected on the network
    • Protection of the motors using an intelligent electronic protection relay. This provides more precise protection of the motors (analysis of operating conditions and alarm thresholds before tripping, etc).
    These two functions can be grouped together in a single product, the electronic protection module. In this case, the protection relay module manages and transmits all this control and protection information directly.
    Advantages of iMCC switchboards
    iMCC control switchboards provide a high level of process availability while ensuring the safety of property and personnel. This solution decreases the number of process stoppages and their duration, reduces maintenance, reduces and repairs costs and optimizes process productivity:
    • Reduction of process stoppages as a result of detailed alarms and diagnostics that enable staff to react before the motor starter trips, or react more quickly if it does trip
    • Rapid diagnostics due to the availability of more detailed information on the stoppage conditions
    • Analysis of stoppage logs using statistics from the electronic protection module.
    iMCC control switchboards make installations easier to create, by reducing engineering and debugging time:
    • Rapid parameter-setting as a result of local or remote downloading
    • Analysis of phenomena via alarms, detailed diagnostics and stoppage logs (statistics embedded in the electronic protection module).

    [Schneider Electric]

    iMCC ( Интеллектуальный центр управления электродвигателями) представляет собой низковольтное комплектное устройство (НКУ) распределения электроэнергии, защиты и управления электродвигателями. Такие НКУ используются для управления непрерывными и полунепрерывными технологическими процессами, в которых для обеспечения эффективной эксплуатации и технического обслуживания необходимо, чтобы пускатели были размещены в одном месте.


    Тематики

    EN

     

    интеллектуальный центр управления электродвигателями
    -
    [Интент]

    Параллельные тексты EN-RU

    iMCC ( Intelligent Motor Control Center) control switchboards are low voltage switchboards dedicated to energy distribution, as well as control and protection of motors. They are used in continuous and semi-continuous processes, in which it is necessary to group the motor starters together in one place for operational and maintenance reasons.

         Integration of motor starters in iMCC switchboards
    iMCC control switchboards make the work of operation and maintenance teams easier by improving the availability of the process, via:
    • Control of motor starters using wire-to-wire cabling or via remote I/O located as close as possible to the starters and connected on the network
    • Protection of the motors using an intelligent electronic protection relay. This provides more precise protection of the motors (analysis of operating conditions and alarm thresholds before tripping, etc).
    These two functions can be grouped together in a single product, the electronic protection module. In this case, the protection relay module manages and transmits all this control and protection information directly.
    Advantages of iMCC switchboards
    iMCC control switchboards provide a high level of process availability while ensuring the safety of property and personnel. This solution decreases the number of process stoppages and their duration, reduces maintenance, reduces and repairs costs and optimizes process productivity:
    • Reduction of process stoppages as a result of detailed alarms and diagnostics that enable staff to react before the motor starter trips, or react more quickly if it does trip
    • Rapid diagnostics due to the availability of more detailed information on the stoppage conditions
    • Analysis of stoppage logs using statistics from the electronic protection module.
    iMCC control switchboards make installations easier to create, by reducing engineering and debugging time:
    • Rapid parameter-setting as a result of local or remote downloading
    • Analysis of phenomena via alarms, detailed diagnostics and stoppage logs (statistics embedded in the electronic protection module).

    [Schneider Electric]

    iMCC ( Интеллектуальный центр управления электродвигателями) представляет собой низковольтное комплектное устройство (НКУ) распределения электроэнергии, защиты и управления электродвигателями. Такие НКУ используются для управления непрерывными и полунепрерывными технологическими процессами, в которых для обеспечения эффективной эксплуатации и технического обслуживания необходимо, чтобы пускатели были размещены в одном месте.


    Тематики

    EN

    Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > IMCC

  • 19 modular data center

    1. модульный центр обработки данных (ЦОД)

     

    модульный центр обработки данных (ЦОД)
    -
    [Интент]

    Параллельные тексты EN-RU

    [ http://loosebolts.wordpress.com/2008/12/02/our-vision-for-generation-4-modular-data-centers-one-way-of-getting-it-just-right/]

    [ http://dcnt.ru/?p=9299#more-9299]

    Data Centers are a hot topic these days. No matter where you look, this once obscure aspect of infrastructure is getting a lot of attention. For years, there have been cost pressures on IT operations and this, when the need for modern capacity is greater than ever, has thrust data centers into the spotlight. Server and rack density continues to rise, placing DC professionals and businesses in tighter and tougher situations while they struggle to manage their IT environments. And now hyper-scale cloud infrastructure is taking traditional technologies to limits never explored before and focusing the imagination of the IT industry on new possibilities.

    В настоящее время центры обработки данных являются широко обсуждаемой темой. Куда ни посмотришь, этот некогда малоизвестный аспект инфраструктуры привлекает все больше внимания. Годами ИТ-отделы испытывали нехватку средств и это выдвинуло ЦОДы в центр внимания, в то время, когда необходимость в современных ЦОДах стала как никогда высокой. Плотность серверов и стоек продолжают расти, все больше усложняя ситуацию для специалистов в области охлаждения и организаций в их попытках управлять своими ИТ-средами. И теперь гипермасштабируемая облачная инфраструктура подвергает традиционные технологии невиданным ранее нагрузкам, и заставляет ИТ-индустрию искать новые возможности.

    At Microsoft, we have focused a lot of thought and research around how to best operate and maintain our global infrastructure and we want to share those learnings. While obviously there are some aspects that we keep to ourselves, we have shared how we operate facilities daily, our technologies and methodologies, and, most importantly, how we monitor and manage our facilities. Whether it’s speaking at industry events, inviting customers to our “Microsoft data center conferences” held in our data centers, or through other media like blogging and white papers, we believe sharing best practices is paramount and will drive the industry forward. So in that vein, we have some interesting news to share.

    В компании MicroSoft уделяют большое внимание изучению наилучших методов эксплуатации и технического обслуживания своей глобальной инфраструктуры и делятся результатами своих исследований. И хотя мы, конечно, не раскрываем некоторые аспекты своих исследований, мы делимся повседневным опытом эксплуатации дата-центров, своими технологиями и методологиями и, что важнее всего, методами контроля и управления своими объектами. Будь то доклады на отраслевых событиях, приглашение клиентов на наши конференции, которые посвящены центрам обработки данных MicroSoft, и проводятся в этих самых дата-центрах, или использование других средств, например, блоги и спецификации, мы уверены, что обмен передовым опытом имеет первостепенное значение и будет продвигать отрасль вперед.

    Today we are sharing our Generation 4 Modular Data Center plan. This is our vision and will be the foundation of our cloud data center infrastructure in the next five years. We believe it is one of the most revolutionary changes to happen to data centers in the last 30 years. Joining me, in writing this blog are Daniel Costello, my director of Data Center Research and Engineering and Christian Belady, principal power and cooling architect. I feel their voices will add significant value to driving understanding around the many benefits included in this new design paradigm.

    Сейчас мы хотим поделиться своим планом модульного дата-центра четвертого поколения. Это наше видение и оно будет основанием для инфраструктуры наших облачных дата-центров в ближайшие пять лет. Мы считаем, что это одно из самых революционных изменений в дата-центрах за последние 30 лет. Вместе со мной в написании этого блога участвовали Дэниел Костелло, директор по исследованиям и инжинирингу дата-центров, и Кристиан Белади, главный архитектор систем энергоснабжения и охлаждения. Мне кажется, что их авторитет придаст больше веса большому количеству преимуществ, включенных в эту новую парадигму проектирования.

    Our “Gen 4” modular data centers will take the flexibility of containerized servers—like those in our Chicago data center—and apply it across the entire facility. So what do we mean by modular? Think of it like “building blocks”, where the data center will be composed of modular units of prefabricated mechanical, electrical, security components, etc., in addition to containerized servers.

    Was there a key driver for the Generation 4 Data Center?

    Наши модульные дата-центры “Gen 4” будут гибкими с контейнерами серверов – как серверы в нашем чикагском дата-центре. И гибкость будет применяться ко всему ЦОД. Итак, что мы подразумеваем под модульностью? Мы думаем о ней как о “строительных блоках”, где дата-центр будет состоять из модульных блоков изготовленных в заводских условиях электрических систем и систем охлаждения, а также систем безопасности и т.п., в дополнение к контейнеризованным серверам.
    Был ли ключевой стимул для разработки дата-центра четвертого поколения?


    If we were to summarize the promise of our Gen 4 design into a single sentence it would be something like this: “A highly modular, scalable, efficient, just-in-time data center capacity program that can be delivered anywhere in the world very quickly and cheaply, while allowing for continued growth as required.” Sounds too good to be true, doesn’t it? Well, keep in mind that these concepts have been in initial development and prototyping for over a year and are based on cumulative knowledge of previous facility generations and the advances we have made since we began our investments in earnest on this new design.

    Если бы нам нужно было обобщить достоинства нашего проекта Gen 4 в одном предложении, это выглядело бы следующим образом: “Центр обработки данных с высоким уровнем модульности, расширяемости, и энергетической эффективности, а также возможностью постоянного расширения, в случае необходимости, который можно очень быстро и дешево развертывать в любом месте мира”. Звучит слишком хорошо для того чтобы быть правдой, не так ли? Ну, не забывайте, что эти концепции находились в процессе начальной разработки и создания опытного образца в течение более одного года и основываются на опыте, накопленном в ходе развития предыдущих поколений ЦОД, а также успехах, сделанных нами со времени, когда мы начали вкладывать серьезные средства в этот новый проект.

    One of the biggest challenges we’ve had at Microsoft is something Mike likes to call the ‘Goldilock’s Problem’. In a nutshell, the problem can be stated as:

    The worst thing we can do in delivering facilities for the business is not have enough capacity online, thus limiting the growth of our products and services.

    Одну из самых больших проблем, с которыми приходилось сталкиваться Майкрософт, Майк любит называть ‘Проблемой Лютика’. Вкратце, эту проблему можно выразить следующим образом:

    Самое худшее, что может быть при строительстве ЦОД для бизнеса, это не располагать достаточными производственными мощностями, и тем самым ограничивать рост наших продуктов и сервисов.

    The second worst thing we can do in delivering facilities for the business is to have too much capacity online.

    А вторым самым худшим моментом в этой сфере может слишком большое количество производственных мощностей.

    This has led to a focus on smart, intelligent growth for the business — refining our overall demand picture. It can’t be too hot. It can’t be too cold. It has to be ‘Just Right!’ The capital dollars of investment are too large to make without long term planning. As we struggled to master these interesting challenges, we had to ensure that our technological plan also included solutions for the business and operational challenges we faced as well.
    So let’s take a high level look at our Generation 4 design

    Это заставило нас сосредоточиваться на интеллектуальном росте для бизнеса — refining our overall demand picture. Это не должно быть слишком горячим. И это не должно быть слишком холодным. Это должно быть ‘как раз, таким как надо!’ Нельзя делать такие большие капиталовложения без долгосрочного планирования. Пока мы старались решить эти интересные проблемы, мы должны были гарантировать, что наш технологический план будет также включать решения для коммерческих и эксплуатационных проблем, с которыми нам также приходилось сталкиваться.
    Давайте рассмотрим наш проект дата-центра четвертого поколения

    Are you ready for some great visuals? Check out this video at Soapbox. Click here for the Microsoft 4th Gen Video.

    It’s a concept video that came out of my Data Center Research and Engineering team, under Daniel Costello, that will give you a view into what we think is the future.

    From a configuration, construct-ability and time to market perspective, our primary goals and objectives are to modularize the whole data center. Not just the server side (like the Chicago facility), but the mechanical and electrical space as well. This means using the same kind of parts in pre-manufactured modules, the ability to use containers, skids, or rack-based deployments and the ability to tailor the Redundancy and Reliability requirements to the application at a very specific level.


    Посмотрите это видео, перейдите по ссылке для просмотра видео о Microsoft 4th Gen:

    Это концептуальное видео, созданное командой отдела Data Center Research and Engineering, возглавляемого Дэниелом Костелло, которое даст вам наше представление о будущем.

    С точки зрения конфигурации, строительной технологичности и времени вывода на рынок, нашими главными целями и задачами агрегатирование всего дата-центра. Не только серверную часть, как дата-центр в Чикаго, но также системы охлаждения и электрические системы. Это означает применение деталей одного типа в сборных модулях, возможность использования контейнеров, салазок, или стоечных систем, а также возможность подстраивать требования избыточности и надежности для данного приложения на очень специфичном уровне.

    Our goals from a cost perspective were simple in concept but tough to deliver. First and foremost, we had to reduce the capital cost per critical Mega Watt by the class of use. Some applications can run with N-level redundancy in the infrastructure, others require a little more infrastructure for support. These different classes of infrastructure requirements meant that optimizing for all cost classes was paramount. At Microsoft, we are not a one trick pony and have many Online products and services (240+) that require different levels of operational support. We understand that and ensured that we addressed it in our design which will allow us to reduce capital costs by 20%-40% or greater depending upon class.


    Нашими целями в области затрат были концептуально простыми, но трудно реализуемыми. В первую очередь мы должны были снизить капитальные затраты в пересчете на один мегаватт, в зависимости от класса резервирования. Некоторые приложения могут вполне работать на базе инфраструктуры с резервированием на уровне N, то есть без резервирования, а для работы других приложений требуется больше инфраструктуры. Эти разные классы требований инфраструктуры подразумевали, что оптимизация всех классов затрат имеет преобладающее значение. В Майкрософт мы не ограничиваемся одним решением и располагаем большим количеством интерактивных продуктов и сервисов (240+), которым требуются разные уровни эксплуатационной поддержки. Мы понимаем это, и учитываем это в своем проекте, который позволит нам сокращать капитальные затраты на 20%-40% или более в зависимости от класса.

    For example, non-critical or geo redundant applications have low hardware reliability requirements on a location basis. As a result, Gen 4 can be configured to provide stripped down, low-cost infrastructure with little or no redundancy and/or temperature control. Let’s say an Online service team decides that due to the dramatically lower cost, they will simply use uncontrolled outside air with temperatures ranging 10-35 C and 20-80% RH. The reality is we are already spec-ing this for all of our servers today and working with server vendors to broaden that range even further as Gen 4 becomes a reality. For this class of infrastructure, we eliminate generators, chillers, UPSs, and possibly lower costs relative to traditional infrastructure.

    Например, некритичные или гео-избыточные системы имеют низкие требования к аппаратной надежности на основе местоположения. В результате этого, Gen 4 можно конфигурировать для упрощенной, недорогой инфраструктуры с низким уровнем (или вообще без резервирования) резервирования и / или температурного контроля. Скажем, команда интерактивного сервиса решает, что, в связи с намного меньшими затратами, они будут просто использовать некондиционированный наружный воздух с температурой 10-35°C и влажностью 20-80% RH. В реальности мы уже сегодня предъявляем эти требования к своим серверам и работаем с поставщиками серверов над еще большим расширением диапазона температур, так как наш модуль и подход Gen 4 становится реальностью. Для подобного класса инфраструктуры мы удаляем генераторы, чиллеры, ИБП, и, возможно, будем предлагать более низкие затраты, по сравнению с традиционной инфраструктурой.

    Applications that demand higher level of redundancy or temperature control will use configurations of Gen 4 to meet those needs, however, they will also cost more (but still less than traditional data centers). We see this cost difference driving engineering behavioral change in that we predict more applications will drive towards Geo redundancy to lower costs.

    Системы, которым требуется более высокий уровень резервирования или температурного контроля, будут использовать конфигурации Gen 4, отвечающие этим требованиям, однако, они будут также стоить больше. Но все равно они будут стоить меньше, чем традиционные дата-центры. Мы предвидим, что эти различия в затратах будут вызывать изменения в методах инжиниринга, и по нашим прогнозам, это будет выражаться в переходе все большего числа систем на гео-избыточность и меньшие затраты.

    Another cool thing about Gen 4 is that it allows us to deploy capacity when our demand dictates it. Once finalized, we will no longer need to make large upfront investments. Imagine driving capital costs more closely in-line with actual demand, thus greatly reducing time-to-market and adding the capacity Online inherent in the design. Also reduced is the amount of construction labor required to put these “building blocks” together. Since the entire platform requires pre-manufacture of its core components, on-site construction costs are lowered. This allows us to maximize our return on invested capital.

    Еще одно достоинство Gen 4 состоит в том, что он позволяет нам разворачивать дополнительные мощности, когда нам это необходимо. Как только мы закончим проект, нам больше не нужно будет делать большие начальные капиталовложения. Представьте себе возможность более точного согласования капитальных затрат с реальными требованиями, и тем самым значительного снижения времени вывода на рынок и интерактивного добавления мощностей, предусматриваемого проектом. Также снижен объем строительных работ, требуемых для сборки этих “строительных блоков”. Поскольку вся платформа требует предварительного изготовления ее базовых компонентов, затраты на сборку также снижены. Это позволит нам увеличить до максимума окупаемость своих капиталовложений.
    Мы все подвергаем сомнению

    In our design process, we questioned everything. You may notice there is no roof and some might be uncomfortable with this. We explored the need of one and throughout our research we got some surprising (positive) results that showed one wasn’t needed.

    В своем процессе проектирования мы все подвергаем сомнению. Вы, наверное, обратили внимание на отсутствие крыши, и некоторым специалистам это могло не понравиться. Мы изучили необходимость в крыше и в ходе своих исследований получили удивительные результаты, которые показали, что крыша не нужна.
    Серийное производство дата центров


    In short, we are striving to bring Henry Ford’s Model T factory to the data center. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Ford#Model_T. Gen 4 will move data centers from a custom design and build model to a commoditized manufacturing approach. We intend to have our components built in factories and then assemble them in one location (the data center site) very quickly. Think about how a computer, car or plane is built today. Components are manufactured by different companies all over the world to a predefined spec and then integrated in one location based on demands and feature requirements. And just like Henry Ford’s assembly line drove the cost of building and the time-to-market down dramatically for the automobile industry, we expect Gen 4 to do the same for data centers. Everything will be pre-manufactured and assembled on the pad.

    Мы хотим применить модель автомобильной фабрики Генри Форда к дата-центру. Проект Gen 4 будет способствовать переходу от модели специализированного проектирования и строительства к товарно-производственному, серийному подходу. Мы намерены изготавливать свои компоненты на заводах, а затем очень быстро собирать их в одном месте, в месте строительства дата-центра. Подумайте о том, как сегодня изготавливается компьютер, автомобиль или самолет. Компоненты изготавливаются по заранее определенным спецификациям разными компаниями во всем мире, затем собираются в одном месте на основе спроса и требуемых характеристик. И точно так же как сборочный конвейер Генри Форда привел к значительному уменьшению затрат на производство и времени вывода на рынок в автомобильной промышленности, мы надеемся, что Gen 4 сделает то же самое для дата-центров. Все будет предварительно изготавливаться и собираться на месте.
    Невероятно энергоэффективный ЦОД


    And did we mention that this platform will be, overall, incredibly energy efficient? From a total energy perspective not only will we have remarkable PUE values, but the total cost of energy going into the facility will be greatly reduced as well. How much energy goes into making concrete? Will we need as much of it? How much energy goes into the fuel of the construction vehicles? This will also be greatly reduced! A key driver is our goal to achieve an average PUE at or below 1.125 by 2012 across our data centers. More than that, we are on a mission to reduce the overall amount of copper and water used in these facilities. We believe these will be the next areas of industry attention when and if the energy problem is solved. So we are asking today…“how can we build a data center with less building”?

    А мы упоминали, что эта платформа будет, в общем, невероятно энергоэффективной? С точки зрения общей энергии, мы получим не только поразительные значения PUE, но общая стоимость энергии, затраченной на объект будет также значительно снижена. Сколько энергии идет на производство бетона? Нам нужно будет столько энергии? Сколько энергии идет на питание инженерных строительных машин? Это тоже будет значительно снижено! Главным стимулом является достижение среднего PUE не больше 1.125 для всех наших дата-центров к 2012 году. Более того, у нас есть задача сокращения общего количества меди и воды в дата-центрах. Мы думаем, что эти задачи станут следующей заботой отрасли после того как будет решена энергетическая проблема. Итак, сегодня мы спрашиваем себя…“как можно построить дата-центр с меньшим объемом строительных работ”?
    Строительство дата центров без чиллеров

    We have talked openly and publicly about building chiller-less data centers and running our facilities using aggressive outside economization. Our sincerest hope is that Gen 4 will completely eliminate the use of water. Today’s data centers use massive amounts of water and we see water as the next scarce resource and have decided to take a proactive stance on making water conservation part of our plan.

    Мы открыто и публично говорили о строительстве дата-центров без чиллеров и активном использовании в наших центрах обработки данных технологий свободного охлаждения или фрикулинга. Мы искренне надеемся, что Gen 4 позволит полностью отказаться от использования воды. Современные дата-центры расходуют большие объемы воды и так как мы считаем воду следующим редким ресурсом, мы решили принять упреждающие меры и включить экономию воды в свой план.

    By sharing this with the industry, we believe everyone can benefit from our methodology. While this concept and approach may be intimidating (or downright frightening) to some in the industry, disclosure ultimately is better for all of us.

    Делясь этим опытом с отраслью, мы считаем, что каждый сможет извлечь выгоду из нашей методологией. Хотя эта концепция и подход могут показаться пугающими (или откровенно страшными) для некоторых отраслевых специалистов, раскрывая свои планы мы, в конечном счете, делаем лучше для всех нас.

    Gen 4 design (even more than just containers), could reduce the ‘religious’ debates in our industry. With the central spine infrastructure in place, containers or pre-manufactured server halls can be either AC or DC, air-side economized or water-side economized, or not economized at all (though the sanity of that might be questioned). Gen 4 will allow us to decommission, repair and upgrade quickly because everything is modular. No longer will we be governed by the initial decisions made when constructing the facility. We will have almost unlimited use and re-use of the facility and site. We will also be able to use power in an ultra-fluid fashion moving load from critical to non-critical as use and capacity requirements dictate.

    Проект Gen 4 позволит уменьшить ‘религиозные’ споры в нашей отрасли. Располагая базовой инфраструктурой, контейнеры или сборные серверные могут оборудоваться системами переменного или постоянного тока, воздушными или водяными экономайзерами, или вообще не использовать экономайзеры. Хотя можно подвергать сомнению разумность такого решения. Gen 4 позволит нам быстро выполнять работы по выводу из эксплуатации, ремонту и модернизации, поскольку все будет модульным. Мы больше не будем руководствоваться начальными решениями, принятыми во время строительства дата-центра. Мы сможем использовать этот дата-центр и инфраструктуру в течение почти неограниченного периода времени. Мы также сможем применять сверхгибкие методы использования электрической энергии, переводя оборудование в режимы критической или некритической нагрузки в соответствии с требуемой мощностью.
    Gen 4 – это стандартная платформа

    Finally, we believe this is a big game changer. Gen 4 will provide a standard platform that our industry can innovate around. For example, all modules in our Gen 4 will have common interfaces clearly defined by our specs and any vendor that meets these specifications will be able to plug into our infrastructure. Whether you are a computer vendor, UPS vendor, generator vendor, etc., you will be able to plug and play into our infrastructure. This means we can also source anyone, anywhere on the globe to minimize costs and maximize performance. We want to help motivate the industry to further innovate—with innovations from which everyone can reap the benefits.

    Наконец, мы уверены, что это будет фактором, который значительно изменит ситуацию. Gen 4 будет представлять собой стандартную платформу, которую отрасль сможет обновлять. Например, все модули в нашем Gen 4 будут иметь общепринятые интерфейсы, четко определяемые нашими спецификациями, и оборудование любого поставщика, которое отвечает этим спецификациям можно будет включать в нашу инфраструктуру. Независимо от того производите вы компьютеры, ИБП, генераторы и т.п., вы сможете включать свое оборудование нашу инфраструктуру. Это означает, что мы также сможем обеспечивать всех, в любом месте земного шара, тем самым сводя до минимума затраты и максимальной увеличивая производительность. Мы хотим создать в отрасли мотивацию для дальнейших инноваций – инноваций, от которых каждый сможет получать выгоду.
    Главные характеристики дата-центров четвертого поколения Gen4

    To summarize, the key characteristics of our Generation 4 data centers are:

    Scalable
    Plug-and-play spine infrastructure
    Factory pre-assembled: Pre-Assembled Containers (PACs) & Pre-Manufactured Buildings (PMBs)
    Rapid deployment
    De-mountable
    Reduce TTM
    Reduced construction
    Sustainable measures

    Ниже приведены главные характеристики дата-центров четвертого поколения Gen 4:

    Расширяемость;
    Готовая к использованию базовая инфраструктура;
    Изготовление в заводских условиях: сборные контейнеры (PAC) и сборные здания (PMB);
    Быстрота развертывания;
    Возможность демонтажа;
    Снижение времени вывода на рынок (TTM);
    Сокращение сроков строительства;
    Экологичность;

    Map applications to DC Class

    We hope you join us on this incredible journey of change and innovation!

    Long hours of research and engineering time are invested into this process. There are still some long days and nights ahead, but the vision is clear. Rest assured however, that we as refine Generation 4, the team will soon be looking to Generation 5 (even if it is a bit farther out). There is always room to get better.


    Использование систем электропитания постоянного тока.

    Мы надеемся, что вы присоединитесь к нам в этом невероятном путешествии по миру изменений и инноваций!

    На этот проект уже потрачены долгие часы исследований и проектирования. И еще предстоит потратить много дней и ночей, но мы имеем четкое представление о конечной цели. Однако будьте уверены, что как только мы доведем до конца проект модульного дата-центра четвертого поколения, мы вскоре начнем думать о проекте дата-центра пятого поколения. Всегда есть возможность для улучшений.

    So if you happen to come across Goldilocks in the forest, and you are curious as to why she is smiling you will know that she feels very good about getting very close to ‘JUST RIGHT’.

    Generations of Evolution – some background on our data center designs

    Так что, если вы встретите в лесу девочку по имени Лютик, и вам станет любопытно, почему она улыбается, вы будете знать, что она очень довольна тем, что очень близко подошла к ‘ОПИМАЛЬНОМУ РЕШЕНИЮ’.
    Поколения эволюции – история развития наших дата-центров

    We thought you might be interested in understanding what happened in the first three generations of our data center designs. When Ray Ozzie wrote his Software plus Services memo it posed a very interesting challenge to us. The winds of change were at ‘tornado’ proportions. That “plus Services” tag had some significant (and unstated) challenges inherent to it. The first was that Microsoft was going to evolve even further into an operations company. While we had been running large scale Internet services since 1995, this development lead us to an entirely new level. Additionally, these “services” would span across both Internet and Enterprise businesses. To those of you who have to operate “stuff”, you know that these are two very different worlds in operational models and challenges. It also meant that, to achieve the same level of reliability and performance required our infrastructure was going to have to scale globally and in a significant way.

    Мы подумали, что может быть вам будет интересно узнать историю первых трех поколений наших центров обработки данных. Когда Рэй Оззи написал свою памятную записку Software plus Services, он поставил перед нами очень интересную задачу. Ветра перемен двигались с ураганной скоростью. Это окончание “plus Services” скрывало в себе какие-то значительные и неопределенные задачи. Первая заключалась в том, что Майкрософт собиралась в еще большей степени стать операционной компанией. Несмотря на то, что мы управляли большими интернет-сервисами, начиная с 1995 г., эта разработка подняла нас на абсолютно новый уровень. Кроме того, эти “сервисы” охватывали интернет-компании и корпорации. Тем, кому приходится всем этим управлять, известно, что есть два очень разных мира в области операционных моделей и задач. Это также означало, что для достижения такого же уровня надежности и производительности требовалось, чтобы наша инфраструктура располагала значительными возможностями расширения в глобальных масштабах.

    It was that intense atmosphere of change that we first started re-evaluating data center technology and processes in general and our ideas began to reach farther than what was accepted by the industry at large. This was the era of Generation 1. As we look at where most of the world’s data centers are today (and where our facilities were), it represented all the known learning and design requirements that had been in place since IBM built the first purpose-built computer room. These facilities focused more around uptime, reliability and redundancy. Big infrastructure was held accountable to solve all potential environmental shortfalls. This is where the majority of infrastructure in the industry still is today.

    Именно в этой атмосфере серьезных изменений мы впервые начали переоценку ЦОД-технологий и технологий вообще, и наши идеи начали выходить за пределы общепринятых в отрасли представлений. Это была эпоха ЦОД первого поколения. Когда мы узнали, где сегодня располагается большинство мировых дата-центров и где находятся наши предприятия, это представляло весь опыт и навыки проектирования, накопленные со времени, когда IBM построила первую серверную. В этих ЦОД больше внимания уделялось бесперебойной работе, надежности и резервированию. Большая инфраструктура была призвана решать все потенциальные экологические проблемы. Сегодня большая часть инфраструктуры все еще находится на этом этапе своего развития.

    We soon realized that traditional data centers were quickly becoming outdated. They were not keeping up with the demands of what was happening technologically and environmentally. That’s when we kicked off our Generation 2 design. Gen 2 facilities started taking into account sustainability, energy efficiency, and really looking at the total cost of energy and operations.

    Очень быстро мы поняли, что стандартные дата-центры очень быстро становятся устаревшими. Они не поспевали за темпами изменений технологических и экологических требований. Именно тогда мы стали разрабатывать ЦОД второго поколения. В этих дата-центрах Gen 2 стали принимать во внимание такие факторы как устойчивое развитие, энергетическая эффективность, а также общие энергетические и эксплуатационные.

    No longer did we view data centers just for the upfront capital costs, but we took a hard look at the facility over the course of its life. Our Quincy, Washington and San Antonio, Texas facilities are examples of our Gen 2 data centers where we explored and implemented new ways to lessen the impact on the environment. These facilities are considered two leading industry examples, based on their energy efficiency and ability to run and operate at new levels of scale and performance by leveraging clean hydro power (Quincy) and recycled waste water (San Antonio) to cool the facility during peak cooling months.

    Мы больше не рассматривали дата-центры только с точки зрения начальных капитальных затрат, а внимательно следили за работой ЦОД на протяжении его срока службы. Наши объекты в Куинси, Вашингтоне, и Сан-Антонио, Техас, являются образцами наших ЦОД второго поколения, в которых мы изучали и применяли на практике новые способы снижения воздействия на окружающую среду. Эти объекты считаются двумя ведущими отраслевыми примерами, исходя из их энергетической эффективности и способности работать на новых уровнях производительности, основанных на использовании чистой энергии воды (Куинси) и рециклирования отработанной воды (Сан-Антонио) для охлаждения объекта в самых жарких месяцах.

    As we were delivering our Gen 2 facilities into steel and concrete, our Generation 3 facilities were rapidly driving the evolution of the program. The key concepts for our Gen 3 design are increased modularity and greater concentration around energy efficiency and scale. The Gen 3 facility will be best represented by the Chicago, Illinois facility currently under construction. This facility will seem very foreign compared to the traditional data center concepts most of the industry is comfortable with. In fact, if you ever sit around in our container hanger in Chicago it will look incredibly different from a traditional raised-floor data center. We anticipate this modularization will drive huge efficiencies in terms of cost and operations for our business. We will also introduce significant changes in the environmental systems used to run our facilities. These concepts and processes (where applicable) will help us gain even greater efficiencies in our existing footprint, allowing us to further maximize infrastructure investments.

    Так как наши ЦОД второго поколения строились из стали и бетона, наши центры обработки данных третьего поколения начали их быстро вытеснять. Главными концептуальными особенностями ЦОД третьего поколения Gen 3 являются повышенная модульность и большее внимание к энергетической эффективности и масштабированию. Дата-центры третьего поколения лучше всего представлены объектом, который в настоящее время строится в Чикаго, Иллинойс. Этот ЦОД будет выглядеть очень необычно, по сравнению с общепринятыми в отрасли представлениями о дата-центре. Действительно, если вам когда-либо удастся побывать в нашем контейнерном ангаре в Чикаго, он покажется вам совершенно непохожим на обычный дата-центр с фальшполом. Мы предполагаем, что этот модульный подход будет способствовать значительному повышению эффективности нашего бизнеса в отношении затрат и операций. Мы также внесем существенные изменения в климатические системы, используемые в наших ЦОД. Эти концепции и технологии, если применимо, позволят нам добиться еще большей эффективности наших существующих дата-центров, и тем самым еще больше увеличивать капиталовложения в инфраструктуру.

    This is definitely a journey, not a destination industry. In fact, our Generation 4 design has been under heavy engineering for viability and cost for over a year. While the demand of our commercial growth required us to make investments as we grew, we treated each step in the learning as a process for further innovation in data centers. The design for our future Gen 4 facilities enabled us to make visionary advances that addressed the challenges of building, running, and operating facilities all in one concerted effort.

    Это определенно путешествие, а не конечный пункт назначения. На самом деле, наш проект ЦОД четвертого поколения подвергался серьезным испытаниям на жизнеспособность и затраты на протяжении целого года. Хотя необходимость в коммерческом росте требовала от нас постоянных капиталовложений, мы рассматривали каждый этап своего развития как шаг к будущим инновациям в области дата-центров. Проект наших будущих ЦОД четвертого поколения Gen 4 позволил нам делать фантастические предположения, которые касались задач строительства, управления и эксплуатации объектов как единого упорядоченного процесса.

    Тематики

    Синонимы

    EN

    Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > modular data center

  • 20 Girard, Philippe de

    SUBJECT AREA: Textiles
    [br]
    b. 1775 France
    d. 1845
    [br]
    French developer of a successful flax-heckling machine for the preparation of fibres for power-spinning.
    [br]
    Early drawing and spinning processes failed to give linen yarn the requisite fineness and homogeneity. In 1810 Napoleon offered a prize of a million francs for a successful flax-spinning machine as part of his policy of stimulating the French textile industries. Spurred on by this offer, Girard suggested three improvements. He was too late to win the prize, but his ideas were patented in England in 1814, although not under his own name. He proposed that the fibres should be soaked in a very hot alkaline solution both before drawing and immediately before they went to the spindles. The actual drawing was to be done by passing the dried material through combs or gills that moved alternately; gill drawing was taken up in England in 1816. His method of wet spinning was never a commercial success, but his processes were adopted in part and developed in Britain and spread to Austria, Poland and France, for his ideas were essentially good and produced a superior product. The successful power-spinning of linen thread from flax depended primarily upon the initial processes of heckling and drawing. The heckling of the bundles or stricks of flax, so as to separate the long fibres of "line" from the shorter ones of "tow", was extremely difficult to mechanize, for each strick had to be combed on both sides in turn and then in the reverse direction. It was to this problem that Girard next turned his attention, inventing a successful machine in 1832 that subsequently was improved in England. The strick was placed between two vertical sheets of combs that moved opposite to each other, depositing the tow upon a revolving cylinder covered with a brush at the bottom of the machine, while the holder from which the strick was suspended moved up and down so as to help the teeth to penetrate deeper into the flax. The tow was removed from the cylinder at the bottom of the machine and taken away to be spun like cotton. The long line fibres were removed from the top of the machine and required further processing if the yarn was to be uniform.
    When N.L.Sadi Carnot's book Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu, was published in 1824, Girard made a favourable report on it.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    M.Daumas (ed.), 1968, Histoire générale des techniques, Vol. III: L'Expansion du
    Machinisme, Paris.
    C.Singer (ed.), 1958, A History of'Technology, Vol. IV, Oxford: Clarendon Press. T.K.Derry and T.I.Williams, 1960, A Short History of Technology from the Earliest
    Times to AD 1900, Oxford.
    W.A.McCutcheon, 1966–7, "Water power in the North of Ireland", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 39 (discusses the spinning of flax and mentions Girard).
    RLH

    Biographical history of technology > Girard, Philippe de

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  • Markovian arrival processes — In queueing theory, Markovian arrival processes are used to model the arrival of customers to a queue. Some of the most common include the Poisson process, Markov arrival process and the batch Markov arrival process. Contents 1 Background 2… …   Wikipedia

  • Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes — Developer(s) the INRIA VASY team Initial release 1986, 24–25 years ago Stable release …   Wikipedia

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